The Dynamics of Congressional Committees in Budget Legislation and Its Impact to Philippine Economic Development

Arvin Karl Demillo Capiral

doi:10.19184/csi.v3i1.31362

Authors

Arvin Karl Demillo Capiral Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Philippines

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.19184/csi.v3i1.31362

Abstract

This research examines the dynamics of the 17th congress in the budget legislation process and posts an argument regarding its impact on Philippine economic development using a qualitative research design. The researchers use theoretical debate and literature study to identify the political motivations that affect the Congressmen in the approval of the budget, namely: self-interest, political clientelism, and political interference. An online interview was conducted with the selected key informants to know the significance of each factor in congress's decision-making regarding the budget's approval. The results indicate that self-interest, political clientelism, political interference, and the executive department significantly influence the congressional committees on the budget legislation process. This article concludes that the effectiveness of lawmakers' roles in managing the economy correlates with the majority of representation held by the government's ruling party, as in the case of the 17th congress.

Keywords: Budget Legislation, General Appropriations Act (GAA), Political Clientelism, Philippine Congress

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

Adolph, Christopher, Christian Breunig, and Chris Koski. ‘Something’s Got to Give: The Political Economy of State Budget Trade-Off’. Midwest Political Science Association., 2007.

Batalla, E. V. C., A. R. Torneo, and F. A. Magno. ‘A Survey of Political Interference Patterns and Modalities in National Roadworks in the Philippines’. Asia-Pacific Social Science Review 18, no. 2 (2018).

Besley, Timothy. Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Brøndal, J. ‘Progressive Era City Government: Reforming From Within and Without-Mordecai Lee. Bureaus of Efficiency: Reforming Local Government in the Progressive Era’. The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 9, no. 2 (2010): 266–68.

Buchanan, James M. ‘Politics Without Romance’. Public Choice 19, no. 3 (2003). https://www.cis.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/images/stories/policy-magazine/2003-spring/2003-19-3-james-m-buchanan.pdf.

Caiden, Gerald E. Administrative Reform Comes of Age. Berlin ; New York: De Gruyter, 2014.

Callahan, Kathe. ‘The Utilization and Effectiveness of Citizen Advisory Committees in the Budget Process of Local Governments’. Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management 14, no. 2 (1 January 2002): 295–319.

Falguera, Norris. ‘Budget Politics in the Philippines’. Pilipinas: A Journal of Philippine Studies 42 (1 March 2004): 1–24.

Fresno, A. ‘Agenda Control in Presidential Systems: Measurement Alternatives to Capture Latent Variables’, EU Working Papers. Italy: European Institute, 2006.

Holcombe, Randall G. ‘Checks and Balances: Enforcing Constitutional Constraints’. Economies 6, no. 4 (December 2018): 57.

Lual, Martino. ‘The Systemic Corruption at the Ministry of Finance and Planning in South Sudan: Mismanagement of Public Funds and Procurement Scandals’. SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY, 2 May 2020.

Mfuru, Allan W.E, Africanus C. Sarwatt, and George Kanire. ‘The Impact of Political Interference in Public Administration in Kibaha Town Council’ 6, no. 4 (2018): 21–31.

Nguyen, Hieu Huu. ‘The Role of State Budget Expenditure on Economic Growth: Empirical Study in Vietnam’. The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business 6, no. 3 (2019): 81–89.

Premchand, A. ‘Public Budgeting and Economic Development: Evolution and Practice of an Idea’. International Journal of Public Administration 24, no. 10 (31 July 2001): 1023–39.

Roniger, Luis. ‘Political Clientelism, Democracy, and Market Economy Economy [Review of Le Clientélisme Politique Dans Les Sociétés Contemporaines; Poor People’s Politics: Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy of Evita; Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation: The European Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective, by J.-L. Briquet, F. Sawicki, J. Auyero, & S. Piattoni].’ Comparative Politics 36, no. 3 (2004): 353–75.

Rougier, Eric, François Combarnous, and Yves-André Fauré. ‘The “Local Economy” Effect of Social Transfers: An Empirical Assessment of the Impact of the Bolsa Família Program on Local Productive Structure and Economic Growth’. World Development 103, no. C (2018): 199–215.

Schug, Mark C., and Jennifer Fontanini. ‘Public Choice Theory and the Role of Government in the Past’. National Council for the Social Studies 58, no. 1 (1994): 20–22.

Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine, and Randy T. Simmons. ‘Egoism, Parochialism, and Universalism’. Rationality and Society 3, no. 1 (1991): 106–32.

Thurmaier, Kurt M., and Katherine G. Willoughby. Policy and Politics in State Budgeting. New York: Routledge, 2014.

Wangwe, F. ‘Overview of Social Cognitive Theory and of SelfEfficacy’, 2012. http//www.emory.edu/EDUCATION/mfp/eff.htm.

Weingrod, Alex. ‘Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties*’. Comparative Studies in Society and History 10, no. 4 (July 1968): 377–400.